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ELF > k @ @ 8 @ @ @ @ 4 4 @ @ @ 2 2 C C x H H H 8 8 8 0 0 h h h ( ( Std 8 8 8 0 0 Ptd Qtd Rtd /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 GNU GNU =~`0贸 I- ` ~FDO {"type":"deb","os":"ubuntu","name":"glibc","version":"2.40-1ubuntu3.1","architecture":"amd64"} d ~FDO {"type":"deb","os":"ubuntu","name":"libcap2","version":"1:2.66-5ubuntu3.1","architecture":"amd64"} GNU R @R T ڡ]em x F i B q l \ r y x 3 h y N < I & g 7 W d A d t > ] O , ~ B , S ( } # H . X " _ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable __gmon_start__ _ITM_registerTMCloneTable __libc_start_main __cxa_finalize __printf_chk cap_free cap_to_name puts putchar cap_get_proc cap_to_text perror exit cap_iab_get_proc cap_iab_to_text cap_get_flag cap_set_flag __stack_chk_fail strcmp cap_set_ambient cap_get_bound strdup cap_from_name strtok stderr __fprintf_chk fwrite sysconf cap_max_bits strlen __isoc23_strtoul strncmp cap_get_mode cap_mode_name cap_set_proc cap_drop_bound cap_get_ambient cap_reset_ambient cap_clear_flag malloc __memcpy_chk cap_from_text fork sleep __sprintf_chk prctl __errno_location strerror cap_set_mode cap_dup chroot chdir cap_set_secbits getenv access cap_get_secbits getuid getpwuid geteuid getgid getgrgid getgroups execve cap_new_launcher cap_launch waitpid strcasestr cap_iab_from_text cap_iab_set_proc setgid cap_setuid kill getpwnam getgrouplist cap_setgroups setenv calloc getgrnam_r __ctype_b_loc __isoc23_strtoull libcap.so.2 libc.so.6 GLIBC_2.3 GLIBC_2.3.4 GLIBC_2.4 GLIBC_2.34 GLIBC_2.38 GLIBC_2.2.5 ii ti ii ui l pl ` ( 0 8 @ @ ` H @ P X ` ` h p x ` 0 ` P @ @ ( 0 8 ` @ ( 0 8 Ç ` h @ p x x ؟ @ ` Ƞ ( ` " ȡ 1 A ( 8 0 h 8 @ Ȣ H N P X 8 ` a p o H { @ H X P X ȥ 8 p ئ 8 h ȧ ( @ P 0 X ̈ h 8 T 0 q X ( X 0 8 @ H Ȫ ` h p 0 x X x ث H H Ɖ , ( ; 0 8 @ H P P 8 X p ` h h p Ю x 8 ` P Ȋ а 8 p 0 ȱ 8 ` h 8 p h Ȳ " 8 3 p P ( W 0 g 8 @ @ x ` h z p x ش 8 ` @ ȵ ʋ @ h ( ж 0 @ H " ` h < p x X ط 8 h ` J й P Ⱥ H @ p H P R X ` ] P ] ( ` Ƚ 8 ( p 0 8 ` h H p x x h X } T R ( F S P ` h p x ( 0 8 @ H P ! 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H=- H[H H@, H He HU| H= Hd JI~H5? j ljQ8}H( II~ H5 , ljV8?H IKI~H5M ljH8H6 I I~ H5 H + DH1DAD9 DE1ɉHt, DAD9RHI~ {H DH- H sILLH< HHDžd L0pLHL Hc{L { Hs H= :4 LH= H= j E HHIH\ HHIH H;HL1HL5o H =LHLLH5upHHtd@AH1LHItVH9tAIU H DPt11L#AH H LHw* HK* eLLHcLuMLD6Hux H= H jH H hH<x H= HK 18KM IHw H!* H81 HI~u IH H Hu H H HHI~xOEIHO H H?u )H H H8H H%I~ 11H5 L5 HI1H @OLHH>t߉H5HHIt_H H5 1L8L럋H' HRv H= Ha GH5= 1BH= H=" ~ H= h H= R H=' < H=' & H=m# H=# H= D H= RH={# <H= &H=$ H=$ t H=$ ^ H=$ H H=r 2 H=B H=3% H=$ vH=$ `H=$ Jf. 1I^HHPTE11H=qs f. H=~ H~ H9tHs Ht H=~ H5~ H)HH?HHHtHs Htf D =~ u+UH=js Ht H=vs yd]~ ] w UH1 HAWAVL5; AUL- ATIH5 S1H&+ @ H LL1 LL- Aԅx0tWIHuLH5 1 D u HH= [A\A]A^A_]fH [A\A]A^A_] UHATS4H+1HHnH5_ IH1ELH[A\]UHATSHHHIHHH5K 1LH[A\]zf. UHSHdH%( HE1utoHH1HM Hp}t:A 1HH KR FHEdH+%( uHH]f D H1 UHAWAVAUIATS1H(dL$%( LeALH= It U D D yHEdH+%( m H(L[A\A]A^A_]? LHEH@ H}L-\ Lu*fLH }DB 1LHHuLHEdH+%( H}H([A\A]A^A_]6oE H s HHc H HDHo IH81H_ Ho Hپ H H81 {EDMIؾ H H HDH;o H H81b 8Ho H= H# f UHSHH~H]IHn H H81 f UHcHh HAUATISHH ISDLD9 H5Q 1qL D 1HH5 KHHt/HL% L 1H HSHuH[A\A]]f H5 1w UHATSHHdL$%( LeIHt8;-t31HuHHU: u HUdH+%( u:H[A\] @ HQm ILH H81m C HH , %s set = %s%u %s%s <unsupported> Current: %s failed to get IAB for process failed to obtain text for IAB Current IAB: %s Capabilities not available clear raise all failed to allocate names failed to %s ambient [%s=%u] <reserved for> %s (%d) %s /bin/bash unlocked yes no ??? --quiet --drop= failed to drop [%s=%u] --dropped= --has-ambient ambient set not supported --addamb= --delamb= --noamb failed to reset ambient set --noenv --inh= Out of memory for inh set none %s %s+i --strict --caps= unable to interpret [%s] --modes Supported modes: UNKNOWN %s --mode unsupported mode: %s failed to set mode [%s]: %s unrecognized command [%s] Mode: %s --inmode= --keep= invalid --keep value --chroot= / --secbits= invalid --secbits value --forkfor= already forked invalid --forkfor value unable to fork() --killit= invalid --killit signo value no forked process to kill Unable to kill child process --uid= invalid --uid value Failed to set uid=%u: %s --cap-uid= invalid --cap-uid value Failed to cap_setuid(%u): %s --gid= invalid --gid value Failed to set gid=%u: %s --groups= No memory for [%s] operation No memory for gid list Failed to setgroups. --user= User [%s] not known unable to set HOME unable to set USER --decode= 0x%016llx= --supports= --print Bounding Ambient secure-noroot: %s (%s) secure-keep-caps: %s (%s) uid=%u(%s) euid=%u(%s) gid=%u(%s) %s%u(%s) Guessed mode: %s (%d) -- == -+ =+ PATH %s/%s failed to create launcher child failed to start execve '%s' failed! --shell= --has-p= cap[%s] not permitted --has-i= cap[%s] not inheritable --has-a= --has-b= --is-uid= invalid --is-uid value uid: got=%d, want=%d --is-gid= invalid --is-gid value gid: got=%d, want=%d --iab= iab: '%s' malformed unable to set IAB tuple --no-new-privs unable to set no-new-privs --has-no-new-privs no-new-privs not set --license --explain= unrecognised value '%s' <unnamed in libcap> (%d) <unsupported> (%d) --suggest= invalid named cap --current --help -h also writing to ns_last_pid. - bounded loops - dead code elimination conversions bypassed permitted memory descriptors. programs. subsystems. system up. (printk) behavior. overriding them. creation. unicast netlink socket. the mknod() system call. - configure tty devices - alter the system clock - enable irix_stime on MIPS - set the real-time clock of processes and the system: - override quota limits real-time clock allocation of arbitrary processes: - setting the domainname - setting the hostname - calling bdflush() - some autofs root ioctls - nfsservctl - VM86_REQUEST_IRQ - removing semaphores - turning swap on/off devices some extra ioctls) - tuning the ide driver device configuration space - setting up serial ports process. - permit ioper/iopl access /dev/bus/usb modify kernel without limit. calls. - RAW sockets - PACKET sockets operations: - interface configuration accounting ownership on sockets - setting promiscuous mode - multicasing listen to multicast. - ATM VCIs below 32 S_APPEND file attributes. capabilities. vector. values socket CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. group ownership of a file. failed to get process capabilities Unable to check CAP_EFFECTIVE CAP_SETPCAP value Unable to %s ambient capability [%s] capability [%s] is unknown to libcap sysconf(%d) returned a non-positive number: %ld [/proc/self/status:CapXXX: 0x%016llx] %s: want non-negative integer, got "%s" obtaining highest capability name WARNING: libcap needs an update (cap=%d should have a name). unable to raise CAP_SETPCAP for BSET changes unable to lower CAP_SETPCAP post BSET change Unable to drop bounding capability [%s] cap[%s] not recognized by library cap[%s] raised in bounding vector libcap:cap_clear_flag() internal error Fatal error concerning process capabilities Fatal error internalizing capabilities Unable to set inheritable capabilities Unable to set capabilities [%s] mismatched mode got=%s want=%s prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, %u) failed: %s Unable to duplicate capabilities unable to select CAP_SET_SYS_CHROOT unable to raise CAP_SYS_CHROOT unable to lower CAP_SYS_CHROOT Unable to chroot/chdir to [%s] failed to set securebits to 0%o/0x%x require non-zero --forkfor value waitpid didn't match child: %u != %u child terminated with odd signal (%d != %d) Too many groups specified (%d) Failed to identify gid for group [%s] Unable to get group list for user Unable to set group list for user Failed to set uid=%u(user=%s): %s cap[%s=%d] not supported by kernel Securebits: 0%lo/0x%lx/%u'b%s (no-new-privs=%d) secure-no-suid-fixup: %s (%s) secure-no-ambient-raise: %s (%s) no PATH environment variable found for re-execing insufficient memory for parts of path insufficient memory for path building failed to wait for PID=%d, result=%x: child PID=%d terminated by signo=%d child PID=%d generated result=%0x cap[%s] not in ambient vector cap[%s] not in bounding vector %s see License file for details. Copyright (c) 2008-11,16,19-21 Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> negative capability (%d) invalid [/proc/self/status:CapXXX: 0x%016llx] usage: %s [args ...] --addamb=xxx add xxx,... capabilities to ambient set --cap-uid=<n> use libcap cap_setuid() to change uid --caps=xxx set caps as per cap_from_text() --chroot=path chroot(2) to this path --current show current caps and IAB vectors --decode=xxx decode a hex string to a list of caps --delamb=xxx remove xxx,... capabilities from ambient --drop=xxx drop xxx,... caps from bounding set --explain=xxx explain what capability xxx permits --forkfor=<n> fork and make child sleep for <n> sec --gid=<n> set gid to <n> (hint: id <username>) --groups=g,... set the supplemental groups --has-a=xxx exit 1 if capability xxx not ambient --has-b=xxx exit 1 if capability xxx not dropped --has-ambient exit 1 unless ambient vector supported --has-i=xxx exit 1 if capability xxx not inheritable --has-p=xxx exit 1 if capability xxx not permitted --has-no-new-privs exit 1 if privs not limited --help, -h this message (or try 'man capsh') --iab=... use cap_iab_from_text() to set iab --inh=xxx set xxx,.. inheritable set --inmode=<xxx> exit 1 if current mode is not <xxx> --is-uid=<n> exit 1 if uid != <n> --is-gid=<n> exit 1 if gid != <n> --keep=<n> set keep-capability bit to <n> --killit=<n> send signal(n) to child --license display license info --mode display current libcap mode --mode=<xxx> set libcap mode to <xxx> --modes list libcap named modes --no-new-privs set sticky process privilege limiter --noamb reset (drop) all ambient capabilities --noenv no fixup of env vars (for --user) --print display capability relevant state --quiet if first argument skip max cap check --secbits=<n> write a new value for securebits --shell=/xx/yy use /xx/yy instead of /bin/bash for -- --strict toggle --caps, --drop and --inh fixups --suggest=text search cap descriptions for text --supports=xxx exit 1 if capability xxx unsupported --uid=<n> set uid to <n> (hint: id <username>) --user=<name> set uid,gid and groups to that of user == re-exec(capsh) with args as for -- =+ cap_launch capsh with args as for -+ -- remaining arguments are for /bin/bash -+ cap_launch /bin/bash with remaining args (without -- [%s] will simply exit(0)) unable to find executable '%s' in PATH Allows a process to perform checkpoint and restore operations. Also permits explicit PID control via clone3() and Allows a process to manipulate aspects of the kernel enhanced Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) system. This is an execution subsystem of the kernel, that manages BPF programs. CAP_BPF permits a process to: - create all types of BPF maps - advanced verifier features: - indirect variable access - BPF to BPF function calls - scalar precision tracking - larger complexity limits - potentially other features Other capabilities can be used together with CAP_BFP to further manipulate the BPF system: - CAP_PERFMON relaxes the verifier checks as follows: - BPF programs can use pointer-to-integer - speculation attack hardening measures can be - bpf_probe_read to read arbitrary kernel memory is - bpf_trace_printk to print the content of kernel - CAP_SYS_ADMIN permits the following: - use of bpf_probe_write_user - iteration over the system-wide loaded programs, maps, links BTFs and convert their IDs to file - CAP_PERFMON is required to load tracing programs. - CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to load networking Allows a process to enable observability of privileged operations related to performance. The mechanisms include perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel Allows a process to read the audit log via a multicast Allows a process to block system suspends - prevent the system from entering a lower power state. Allows a process to trigger something that can wake the Allows a process to configure the kernel's syslog Allows a process to configure the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policy. Not all kernels are configured with a MAC enabled, but if they are this capability is reserved for code to perform administration tasks. Allows a process to override Manditory Access Control (MAC) access. Not all kernels are configured with a MAC mechanism, but this is the capability reserved for Allows a process to set capabilities on files. Permits a process to uid_map the uid=0 of the parent user namespace into that of the child namespace. Also, permits a process to override securebits locks through user namespace Allows a process to configure audit logging via a Allows a process to write to the audit log via a Allows a process to take leases on files. Allows a process to perform privileged operations with Allows a process to manipulate tty devices: - perform vhangup() of a tty Allows a process to perform time manipulation of clocks: Allows a process to adjust resource related parameters - set and override resource limits - override the reserved space on ext2 filesystem (this can also be achieved via CAP_FSETID) - modify the data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem, which uses journaling resources - override size restrictions on IPC message queues - configure more than 64Hz interrupts from the - override the maximum number of consoles for console - override the maximum number of keymaps Allows a process to maipulate the execution priorities - those involving different UIDs - setting their CPU affinity - alter the FIFO vs. round-robin (realtime) scheduling for itself and other processes. Allows a process to initiate a reboot of the system. Allows a process to perform a somewhat arbitrary grab-bag of privileged operations. Over time, this capability should weaken as specific capabilities are created for subsets of CAP_SYS_ADMINs functionality: - configuration of the secure attention key - administration of the random device - examination and configuration of disk quotas - mount() and umount(), setting up new SMB connection - to read/write pci config on alpha - irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) - flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) - Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores and shared memory - locking/unlocking of shared memory segment - forged pids on socket credentials passing - setting readahead and flushing buffers on block - setting geometry in floppy driver - turning DMA on/off in xd driver - administration of md devices (mostly the above, but - access to the nvram device - administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) - manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver - reading non-standardized portions of PCI - DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver - sending raw qic-117 commands - enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending arbitrary SCSI commands - setting encryption key on loopback filesystem - setting zone reclaim policy Allows a process to configure process accounting. Allows a process to perform a ptrace() of any other Allows a process to perform a chroot syscall to change the effective root of the process' file system: redirect to directory "/" to some other location. Allows a process to perform raw IO: - permit sending USB messages to any device via Allows a process to initiate the loading and unloading of kernel modules. This capability can effectively Allows a process to override IPC ownership checks. Allows a process to lock shared memory segments for IPC purposes. Also enables mlock and mlockall system Allows a process to use raw networking: - binding to any address for transparent proxying (also permitted via CAP_NET_ADMIN) Allows a process to perform network configuration - administration of IP firewall, masquerading and - setting debug options on sockets - modification of routing tables - setting arbitrary process, and process group (this is also allowed via CAP_NET_RAW) - setting TOS (Type of service) - clearing driver statistics - read/write of device-specific registers - activation of ATM control sockets Allows a process to broadcast to the network and to Allows a process to bind to privileged ports: - TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 Allows a process to modify the S_IMMUTABLE and Allows a process to freely manipulate its inheritable Linux supports the POSIX.1e Inheritable set, the POXIX.1e (X vector) known in Linux as the Bounding vector, as well as the Linux extension Ambient vector. This capability permits dropping bits from the Bounding vector (ie. raising B bits in the libcap IAB representation). It also permits the process to raise Ambient vector bits that are both raised in the Permitted and Inheritable sets of the process. This capability cannot be used to raise Permitted bits, Effective bits beyond those already present in the process' permitted set, or Inheritable bits beyond those present in the Bounding [Historical note: prior to the advent of file capabilities (2008), this capability was suppressed by default, as its unsuppressed behavior was not auditable: it could asynchronously grant its own Permitted capabilities to and remove capabilities from other processes arbitrarily. The former leads to undefined behavior, and the latter is better served by the kill system call.] Allows a process to freely manipulate its own UIDs: - arbitrarily set the UID, EUID, REUID and RESUID - allows the forging of UID credentials passed over a Allows a process to freely manipulate its own GIDs: - arbitrarily set the GID, EGID, REGID, RESGID values - arbitrarily set the supplementary GIDs - allows the forging of GID credentials passed over a Allows a process to send a kill(2) signal to any other process - overriding the limitation that there be a [E]UID match between source and target process. Allows a process to set the S_ISUID and S_ISUID bits of the file permissions, even when the process' effective UID or GID/supplementary GIDs do not match that of the Allows a process to perform operations on files, even where file owner ID should otherwise need be equal to the UID, except where CAP_FSETID is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. Allows a process to override all DAC restrictions limiting the read and search of files and directories. This excludes DAC access covered by Allows a process to override of all Discretionary Access Control (DAC) access, including ACL execute access. That is read, write or execute files that the process would otherwise not have access to. This excludes DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. Allows a process to arbitrarily change the user and ; ܈l & \ ̪ H L < \` < zR x & D $ 4 X~ FJ w ?9*3$" \ 0 t 0 AM DIIK G S LO AC CC h \V AC CJ $ >4 @ | AC Ex G d 2, 4 | AC FF| L E ȭG AC AU A ( AO DH J $ AC CT E , f! EC P l pl ` @ ` @ ` ` 0 ` P @ @ ` @ r o H - o o h o o o H 0@ @@ P@ `@ p@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A A A 0A @A PA `A pA A A A A A A A A B B B 0B @B PB `B pB B B B B B B B B C C C 0C @C PC `C pC C C C C C C C C D D D 0D @D PD `D pD D D D D D D D Ç @ x ؟ @ ` Ƞ ( ` " ȡ 1 A 8 h Ȣ N 8 a p o H { X ȥ 8 p ئ 8 h ȧ 0 ̈ h 8 T 0 q X X Ȫ 0 X x ث H H Ɖ , ; P 8 p h Ю 8 ` P Ȋ а 8 p ȱ 8 h Ȳ " 8 3 p P W g @ x z ش 8 ` @ ȵ ʋ @ h ж " < X ط 8 h ` J й P Ⱥ H p R ] P ] ( ` Ƚ 8 p H x h X } /usr/lib/debug/.dwz/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcap2-bin.debug *Iabn05t b4873d8b7e6030e8b4b8a0a0d60ee60b492dd1.debug + .shstrtab .interp .note.gnu.property .note.gnu.build-id .note.package .note.ABI-tag .gnu.hash .dynsym .dynstr .gnu.version .gnu.version_r .rela.dyn .rela.plt .init .plt.got .plt.sec .text .fini .rodata .eh_frame_hdr .eh_frame .init_array .fini_array .data.rel.ro .dynamic .data .bss .gnu_debugaltlink .gnu_debuglink 8 8 0 & h h $ 9 G p p U o 0 _ g o o | o h h p B - - @ @ @ @ D D 0 E E I I ( r r A P H H H H H h K . 4 4 h =